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THE U.S. ECONOMY: IS THERE
A WAY OUT OF THE WOODS?
 ,  . ,
 , and 
During the last 10 years,the Levy Institute has published a series of papers on the evolving strategic
predicaments facing the U.S.economy.Our work has never really taken hold in the United States,
which may be a consequence of the unrepentantly Keynesian structure of our model, by which
we continue to stand although it is not currently fashionable. But it may also be a result of the
rather parochial attitude of many U.S. economists and institutions. In any event, it is high time
we looked back on our endeavor and made an evaluation of it. Some repetition is unavoidable.
Methods and Concepts
Our assessments of the U.S.economy have not so far focused on short-term prospects,and this has
distinguished our work from that of commentators whose evaluation is based on monthly and
quarterly indicators. Up to now, we have concentrated on the medium term, trying to diagnose
whether or not the configuration of “drivers”—the forces generating expansion or contraction—
would be sustainable in the medium term,and hence whether the overall stance of fiscal and mone-
tarypolicywasviablelookingforwardtoastrategictimehorizon,andwhatchangesinpolicy,if any,
should come under consideration.
Looking back, we may have erred in not being more explicit about the model we use.1 The
following skeleton may be useful.
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and Research Scholars   and  . All questions and correspondence should be directed to Professor
Papadimitriou at 845-758-7700 or dbp@levy.org. The authors are grateful for comments from Warren Mosler and L. Randall Wray.The real (inflation-adjusted) national income, Y, is defined as
Y = G + X – M + PX A)
where all variables are deflated flows,G is government expendi-
ture, X is exports plus property income and foreign transfers,M
is imports, and PX is total private expenditure. Subtracting T,
defined as government taxes and transfers, from both sides and
rearranging we have
Y – T – PX = [G – T] + [X – M] B1)
or
0 = [G – T] + [X – M] – PNS B)
where PNS is private net saving—that is, private disposable
income less total private expenditure, including both consump-
tion and investment.
Equations B1) and B) both state that private net saving is
always identically equal to the government’s budget deficit plus
the current account surplus. Though in themselves nothing
more than accounting identities, these equations carry some
important implications. Each balance implies an equivalent
change in a stock variable: subject to the effect of capital gains,
the budget deficit implies a change in the stock of government
debt,a current account deficit implies a change in the net stock
of overseas assets, and the private balance implies a change in
net private wealth. As there is a limit to the extent to which
stocks of debt can be allowed to rise relative to GDP, there is a
corresponding limit to the extent to which the financial bal-
ances can (be allowed to) fluctuate, implying that the ratios of
stocks to GDP have norms that can sometimes be used to eval-
uate strategic options. For instance, if the government or over-
seas debt-to-GDP ratios are limited to 50 percent, this implies
that the ratio of the budget or current account deficit to GDP
cannot for long be allowed to exceed half the nominal growth
rate. The nominal growth rate since 1960 has averaged 7 per-
cent, so it is not surprising that the mean ratio of the budget
deficit to GDP between 1960 and 2006 was 2.8 percent, for the
foreign balance it was –1.1 percent,and for private net saving it
was (plus) 1.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.02 in
each case.
Although the three balances must always sum to exactly
zero, no single balance is more a residual than either of the
other two. Each balance has a life of its own, and it is the level
of real output that,with minor qualifications,brings about their
equivalence. Underlying the main conclusions of our reports is
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aneconometricmodelinwhichexports,imports,taxes,and pri-
vate expenditure are determined as functions of such things as
world trade, relative prices, tax rates, and flows of net lending
to the private sector. However, neither the knowledge that this
is the case nor the perusal of any list of econometric equations
will, on its own, impart any intuition as to why output moved
as it did over any set period.
We attempt to rectify this, up to a point, in Figure 1.
Thelowerpartof thefigure,usingtheleft-handscale,shows
the year-by-year growth rate of GDP between 1980 and the sec-
ond quarter of 2007. The upper part of the figure, using the
right-hand scale, shows the quarterly evolution, over the same
period, of the three balances expressed as proportions of GDP,
but are otherwise exactly as described in equation B. Note that
the negative sign on private net saving (PNS/GDP) in equation
B) signifies that the relevant line in the figure is describing pri-
vate expenditure less disposable income (i.e., negative net sav-
ing). Thus, all three lines—our three “drivers”—are in equiva-
lence with one another, in that an upward movement in each
denotesanupwardimpetustotheeconomy,andviceversa.2Each
balance is measuring an arterial flow of expenditure into the
economybyonesector,lessacounterpartoutflowfromthesame
sector,and therefore approximately measures its effect on aggre-
gate demand. Figure 1 illustrates, for example, how each of the
last three recessions (1982,1991,and 2001) and each subsequent
recovery was caused by a sharp fall in private expenditure rela-
tive to income, followed by a sharp rise. The first strong vertical
line marks the beginning, in 1992, of the famously long period
of relatively smooth and rapid“Goldilocks”expansion. The sec-
ond vertical line indicates the year that the first major Levy
Institute Strategic Analysis (Godley 1999) was published.
The Conclusions We Drew
It is not easy now to remember the atmosphere of self-congrat-
ulation that enveloped the public discussion around 1999. The
economy had enjoyed seven years of reasonably smooth and
rapid expansion without inflation. The budget was in surplus,
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was projecting a
rise in that surplus. The United States was supposedly possessed
of a New Economy, and the good times were here to stay. The
business cycle had been abolished, leading Alan Blinder to com-
pare the U.S. economy to Ol’ Man River, which just kept rolling
along. The use of fiscal policy as a regulator had forever beenforesworn.And the budget surplus,shown in the figure as a neg-
ative balance in 1999, was seen as a good thing in and of itself.
We took a radically different view, however. As Figure 1
shows,the government and foreign sectors had both been falling
rapidly throughout 1992–99, subtracting increasing amounts
fromaggregatedemand.Thesefallswereoffsetbyprivate expen-
diture, which rose much faster than income, until private net
saving—for the first time in history—became substantially neg-
ative, while private borrowing and debt rose to record levels. It
should have been obvious to everyone at that euphoric time that
this configuration of “drivers” could not possibly be sustained,
and that a major change in policy would soon have to take place.
Wemadenoshort-termforecastin1999,ourviewbeingthat
bubbles and booms often continue much longer than
anyone can believe possible and there could well be a
further year or two of robust expansion. The perspective
taken here is strategic in the sense that it is only con-
cerned with developments over the next five to 15 years
as a whole. Any recommendations regarding policy do
not have the character of “fine-tuning” in response to
short-term disturbances. They ask, rather, whether the
present stance of either fiscal or trade policy is struc-
turally appropriate looking to the medium- and long-
term future (Godley 1999, p. 1).
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Government Deficit (right-hand scale [RHS])
Current Account Balance (RHS)
Private Spending Less Income (RHS)
Real GDP Growth (left-hand scale)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’calculations
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Our conclusion (1999, p. 9) was that the boom in private
expenditure could not continue indefinitely and must at some
stage go into reverse, implying that “the whole stance of fiscal
policy [was] wrong in that it [was] much too restrictive to be
consistent with full employment in the long run.”The implica-
tion for policy was that when the tide turned (not before) there
would have to be a fiscal reflation on the order of $400 billion
(1999,p.10).Wealsotooktheviewin1999(andagain,withmore
precision, in 2001) that in the absence of measures to improve
netexports,anadequategrowthinoutputwouldgenerate a cur-
rent account deficit in 2006 equal to about 6 percent of GDP
(Godley and Izurieta 2001, p. 9). This conditional prediction,
which turned out to be quite accurate, was derived from some
very straightforward econometric equations that have so far
served us well. We have been surprised that so many people—
including Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke
(2007)3—when they belatedly realized how large the current
account deficit had become, put the whole thing down to a
“saving glut” in the rest of the world and not the “fault” of the
United States at all.Our earlier conclusion (Godley 1999,p.10)
was that,in addition to a large fiscal stimulus,there would have
to be a large real devaluation of the dollar—which we put at 20
percent—to take place immediately.
These judgments look reasonably good today. The boom
did indeed continue for another year or so, but private net sav-
ing, as shown in Figure 1, started to rise sharply in 2000—
shown as a fall in the chart (because it describes a fall in expen-
diture relative to income)—and this would have generated a
severe recession had there not been, simultaneously, a large fis-
cal stimulus (also clearly shown in the figure).4 It is not a sim-
ple matter to measure the scale of the fiscal stimulus,5 but in
2001 the CBO was projecting a budget surplus equal to 3.4 per-
cent of GDP in 2005, whereas the outturn shows a deficit of
about 2.6 percent (although output had reached roughly the
same level as that originally projected by the CBO).This seems
to imply that the fiscal stimulus was equal to about 6 percent of
GDP. Regardless, Figure 1 shows a rise in the budget deficit
between 2001 and 2003 that quite neatly offsets the fall in pri-
vate expenditure relative to income. The stimulus was in some
degree reinforced by a relaxation in monetary policy, but the
effect of this cannot have beenvery large at that time,as no effect
on private net saving can be observed. The dollar, far from
falling 20 percent,actually appreciated until 2002,and no other
measures were taken to improve the current account balance,4 Strategic Analysis, November 2007























Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis,Federal Reserve,and authors’calculations
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which continued to deteriorate rapidly in 2002 and for several
years thereafter.
Wehavenotrehearsedallthismerelytosupportaclaimthat
our work has been a useful contribution to the public discus-
sion. We are also implicitly contrasting our views about how
the economy functions with those fashionable at that time and
subsequently. In our strong opinion, the huge fiscal stimulus in
2001 saved the United States from a much deeper recession than
actually occurred. But because this stimulus was applied con-
trary to the philosophy and rhetoric of the times, few have
seemed to admit, or even notice, that it happened. The configu-
ration of balances illustrated inthe figuresuggeststhat arehabil-
itation of fiscal policy as a key regulator of the economy is now in
order, together, by implication, with some demotion of monetary
policy from its present exalted status.
Postrecession
Analysis of net saving by the private sector often requires that
the total be disaggregated into the personal and business sec-
tors, because the two often behave quite differently from each
other.Forinstance,Figure1doesnotrevealthatthe2001reces-
sionwascausedbyafallinbusinessspendingbeginningin2000
that exceeded the continued rise in personal spending.
Figure 2 shows how business expenditure stopped falling
in 2004 and started rising again, while personal expenditure
rose at such a rate that private sector spending as a whole rose
again relative to income, by 3 percent, between 2002 and 2007.
The rise in personal expenditure, on which continuous growth
of the U.S. economy largely depended after 2001, was directly
and indirectly caused by the hysterical boom in the housing
market. The genesis of this boom has been extensively dis-
cussed in the financial press and elsewhere.It was partly caused
by over-lax monetary policy. It was also helped along by the
fact that subprime mortgages had been“packaged,”securitized
and bought with borrowed money in U.S. and world markets,
even when they were worth far less than the rating agencies
claimed, to the great (and largely risk-free) profit of the lend-
ing chain. Although subprime mortgages account for only a
small proportion of all mortgages, their total has risen to a
very large figure—about $1.5 trillion.6 That all this was hap-
pening was well known two or more years ago, and it was
quite well described in our September 2005 Strategic Analysis
(Godley et al., p. 8), so it is a bit strange that the process was










































































Median Price of Existing Homes (left-hand scale)
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis,Federal Reserve,Association of
Realtors,and authors’calculations
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allowed to continue for so long, and that so much money was
lost by financial“experts”when the debacle arrived.
Scenarios for the Future
As pointed out at the beginning of this report, our work hith-
erto has concentrated entirely on medium-term,strategic devel-
opments. This is not sensible on the present occasion because of
likely adverse developments in the very short term as a result of
the credit crunch that would be ridiculous to ignore. However,
medium-term prospects have been transformed as a conse-
quence of thedevaluation of thedollar(21percent forthebroad
measuresince2002,andmorethan50percentagainsttheeuro)7
andtheunusuallyrapidgrowthof worldtrade.Therehasalready
been a large increase in net exports, a trend that seems likely to
continue. Our first major conclusion (ignoring exotic possibili-
ties such as the spread of war) is that developments over the next
two to three years will turn on the scale and duration of the fall in
demand immediately resulting from the crunch, and whether, and
to what extent, this fall will be offset by a continued rise in net
export demand.
Putting Numbers on All This
While recognizing the hazardous nature of the following exer-
cise, we now attempt to put numbers on various possible out-
comes. We do this in four stages. First, we describe a range of
outcomes for private borrowing based (very unscientifically) on
an inspection of past crunches. Second, we infer, using econo-
metric estimates,the implications for private expenditure of our
assumptions about borrowing. Third, we make assumptions
about the balance of payments and fiscal policy in the medium
term.Finally,we put all these and other assumptions together to
derive medium-term projections for the three financial balances
andchangesintotaloutput,usingthesameformatasinFigure1.
Stage 1
So far as the credit crunch goes, there seems to be widespread
agreement that, everything taken together, the present crisis is
already more serious than any that has occurred before in mod-
ern times. Major banks and other financial institutions are still,
almost daily,revealing huge losses as a result of imprudent lend-
ing. House prices are falling (Figure 3). And there is a general
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Imports (right-hand scale [RHS])
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Current Account Balance (left-hand scale)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’calculations
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Solid Lines = Historical Data and Credit Crunch Scenario
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sense that some further deterioration is in prospect, particularly
as many more subprime borrowers (and some others who
obtained so-called “interest only” loans or loans with enticing
“teaser” rates of interest) are going to come under increased
pressure as their initial rates are raised over the coming year.We
are going to assume that the overall effects on the economy at
largewilllargelydependontheextenttowhichnetlendingtothe
private sector is reduced through the unwillingness, or inability,
of borrowers to borrow and lenders to lend.
As there is no reliable way of inferring the effects of the
crunch on borrowing, we set out a range of possibilities, using
the past as a guide,which are illustrated in the next three figures.
Each of these figures shows upper and lower projections that
together describe what we take to be a reasonable range within
which the outcome will lie.
So far as the personal sector is concerned (Figure 4), our
“pessimistic” guess is that borrowing will fall, over a period of
two years, to almost zero, after which it recovers moderately.We
think it unlikely (under the postulated“pessimistic”assumption)
that there could be any significant mitigation from an easing of
monetary policy.Our“optimistic”assumption is that borrowing
will fall to 2.8 percent of GDP, which is roughly what it did in
the early 1990s,and then recover to a rate of about 4.5 percent,
causing debt to rise at about the same rate as disposable income.
Astothebusinesssector(Figure5),wehaveenteredamuch
wider range of possibilities,reflecting our very great uncertainty
about the future.Our“pessimistic”projection is not unlike what
happened in each of the last three recessions, while our “opti-
mistic” assumption is that borrowing will hardly fall at all.
Figure 6 simply combines the two previous figures to give
the implied range for total private borrowing within which we
expect, with considerable misgiving, the outcome to lie.
Stage 2: Borrowing and Spending
Figure 6 shows the history, from 1970 to the present, of private
spending in excess of income (negative net saving) together
with private borrowing, illustrating the close, if somewhat
erratic,relationship between these two series in the past.Going
forward, we have entered, for borrowing, our range of projec-
tionsforthepersonalandbusinesssectors(derivedfromFigures
4 and 5) together with implied levels of spending in excess of
income. These projections for spending are not the outcome of
a process of mere “eye balling.” Rather, they are derived from aThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Figure 8 Historyand“CreditCrunch”Projections:













































Government Deficit (right-hand scale [RHS])
Current Account Balance (RHS)
Private Spending Less Income (RHS)
Real GDP Growth (left-hand scale)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’calculations
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simultaneous solution of the whole of our model, which, in
addition to assumptions about net saving,includes assumptions
about fiscal policy, the balance of payments, and capital gains.
Stage 3: The Balance of Payments and Fiscal Policy
Our further assumptions are standard to our Strategic Analysis
approach: we assume a path for the government deficit broad-
ly in line with CBO (2007) predictions, one based on a gradual
reduction in the general government deficit; we adopt widely
accepted forecasts for world output growth;8 we assume no
change in monetary policy from its current (October 2007)
stance; and we assume a further 5 percent devaluation of the
dollar by the end of 2007 and a stable exchange rate for the rest
of the simulation period.
Such assumptions imply that exports continue to grow at a
fast rate,relative to GDP (Figure 7),while imports growth slows
down—an impact that is more marked in the “credit crunch”
regime than in the “soft landing.” The balance of payments
improves not only because of trade, but also because the flow of
interest payments on U.S. financial assets denominated in euros,
as well as net property income from U.S. direct investment
abroad,willincreasetheirdollarvalueafterthedollardevaluation.
Stage 4: Putting It All Together
InFigures8and9wehavedrawntheimplicationsof ourassump-
tions for the growth rate in real GDP and the balances of the
main sectors.
The entirely new feature of this projection relative to our
earlier estimates is that there is an improvement in net exports
such that the balance of payments approaches zero by 2010,to a
considerable extent sustaining aggregate demand. Nevertheless,
under the“credit crunch”assumption (Figure 8), the fall in pri-
vate expenditure is so large that the economy will enter a reces-
sion next year. Our projections, taken literally, imply three suc-
cessive quarters of negative real GDP growth in 2008. Spending
in excess of income returns to negative territory, reaching -1.6
percent of GDP in the last quarter of 2012—a value that is very
close to its “prebubble” historical average. The recovery in total
demand comes about as the fall in private expenditure begins to
level off.Since private spending (less income) stabilizes as a pro-
portion of GDP from 2009 onward, this carries the implication
that private spending is rising at roughly the same rate as GDP.
Figure 9 Historyand“Soft Landing”Projections:
U.S.GDPGrowthand Main Sector Balances
Government Deficit (right-hand scale [RHS])
Current Account Balance (RHS)
Private Expenditure Less Income (RHS)
Real GDP Growth (left-hand scale)
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far below the average deficit in the past and,in our view,corre-
spondingly far below a deficit consistent with balanced growth
at full employment, because it would generate insufficient
financial assets to meet the demand from the private sector.We
conclude that at some stage there will have to be a relaxation of
fiscal policy large enough to add perhaps 2 percent of GDP to
the budget deficit.Moreover,should the slowdown in the econ-
omy over the next two to three years come to seem intolerable,
we would support a relaxation having the same scale, and per-
haps duration, as that which occurred around 2001.
Our projections suggest the exciting, if still rather remote,
possibility that, once the forthcoming financial turmoil has
been worked through, the United States could be set on a path
of balanced growth combined with full employment.
The budget deficit will deteriorate with respect to CBO
projections, as the slowdown in the economy implies a drop in
general government receipts that we don’t compensate for in
our simulation.
Our“softlanding”assumptions(Figure9)implyalesssevere
growth recession in 2009, with real GDP growth slowing to less
than 1 percent.
Under both assumptions, household debt relative to GDP
peaks in 2008, and then decreases—more rapidly in the “credit
crunch”regime.9
Summary and Conclusions
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that we are not making
short-term forecasts, nor forecasts of the ordinary kind at all. If
we put numbers on things to help ourselves think precisely
about strategic problems, we must necessarily assign them pre-
cise dates; but we can really only hope to represent broad shapes
andtrends.Ourprojectionsare,however,describedinawaythat
will be extremely easy to verify and modify as the future unfolds,
and we look forward to finding out, albeit with some trepida-
tion, how well we have scored.
As we write (on November 6), events have, if anything,
taken a turn for the worse, and the financial press seems to be
presidingoveranincipientmaelstrom.Thismakesusinclinedto
think that the outcome during the next two years is rather likely
to resemble the projections derived from our more pessimistic
assumption.
Two mitigating factors are, first, net export demand looks
set to expand at an unusually rapid rate and for a considerable
length of time. Second,while the fall in private expenditure (in
excess of income) may be relatively large over the next two to
three years, it should eventually stabilize and thereafter con-
tribute positively to the growth of aggregate demand.10 Both
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show a satisfying convergence of all three
balances toward zero over the next five years. However, while
the rate of growth in GDP may recover to something like its
long-term average, all our simulations show that the level of
GDP in the next two years or more remains well below that of
productive capacity.
In our view, the failure of GDP to recover properly is
directly related to the fiscal policy stance, which, as it stands,
implies a budget deficit equal to 1.5 percent of GDP at the end
of the projection period in the“credit crunch”scenario. This isThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
Notes
1. A fairly detailed account was given in Godley (1999),
appendix 2.
2. But it obviously does not imply that the sum of changes in
the balances equals the growth rate. Changes in the bal-
ances,measuredexpost,candonomorethanbroadlyillus-
trate the sources of expansion or contraction.
3. We find it surprising that Bernanke (2007) seems to sup-
posethatasufficientcondition forimprovingthenotorious
imbalances is that saving increases in the United States and
falls elsewhere. But this would be an incomplete and coun-
terproductive remedy, unless there were also a mechanism,
such as dollar devaluation, to move resources into the
export sector.
4. We use “fiscal stimulus” to mean any increase in govern-
ment deficit that our model shows to be independent of
changes in other sector balances.
5. See CBO (2001) Table 1–2, p. 5. Figures refer to the federal
deficit for the fiscal year.
6. ThisfigureistakenfromaWallStreetJournalstudyof Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act data (Brooks and Ford 2007), and




7. The amount of the devaluation varies considerably accord-
ing to how it is measured. The dollar fell by 50.4 percent
against the euro if we compare the September 30,2007, fig-
ure with the 2002 average. It has declined by 65.4 percent
if we compare the 2007 figure against the 2002 peak,which
occurredonJanuary31.ThedevaluationagainsttheFederal
Reserve nominal broad index has been 20.8 percent against
the 2002 average and 22.8 percent against its 2002 peak,
which occurred on February 27.
8. The Economist 2007; IMF 2007
9. We also briefly considered what would happen if house-
hold borrowing did not decrease at all, and remained at
the current level of 6.7 percent. In this case, real GDP
would keep growing at a reasonable rate throughout the
simulation period, but household debt would keep rising
relative to GDP. Such a scenario would simply postpone
the day of reckoning.
10. A stable ratio implies that growth is positive at the same
rate as GDP.
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